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Abstract 
We incorporate intermediate inputs into a small-union general-equilibrium model and 
develop the welfare economics of preferential trading under the rules of origin.  Combining this 
analysis with the Grossman-Helpman political-economy model, we demonstrate that the rules of 
origin can improve the political viability of FTAs.  Two interesting outcomes are derived.  First, 
an FTA that lowered joint welfare of the union and was voted down in the absence of the rules of 
origin may become feasible in the presence of these rules.  Second, an FTA that increased joint 
welfare of the union but was voted down in the absence of the rules of origin may become 
acceptable in the presence of these rules but it may also turn welfare inferior to status quo.
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 1.  Introduction 
The rules of origin (ROOs) are an integral part of Free Trade Areas (FTAs): union 
members confer duty-free status on a product only if a pre-specified proportion of its value 
added originates within the union. Though it is generally recognized that ROOs make FTAs 
politically more acceptable, we lack a formal analysis supporting this proposition.
1  Since 
intermediate inputs are rarely incorporated into the formal models of FTAs, the recent political-
economy-theoretic literature leaves the role of ROOs entirely out of consideration.
2  This is true 
of the pioneering contribution by Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1995) as also of the 
important paper by Pravin Krishna (1998).
3   
In this paper, we have two broad objectives.  First, we incorporate intermediate inputs 
into the analysis and derive the implications of the ROOs for the political feasibility of FTAs.  
Second, we systematically discuss the welfare implications of FTAs in the presence of 
intermediate inputs and ROOs.  In addition to being of interest in their own right, these results 
                                                 
1 The nascent literature on ROOs includes Kala Krishna and Anne Krueger (1995), Jiandong Ju and Krishna 
(1998) and Rod Falvey and Geoff Reed (1997, 1998). 
2 Two recent surveys of the traditional and modern theoretical literature on preferential trade areas (PTAs) are 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Panagariya (2000).  Among the recent contributions to the literature, 
mention may be made of Richard Baldwin (1995), Jagdish Bhagwati (1993), Eric Bond and Constantinos 
Syropoulos (1996), Olivier Cadot, Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999), Wilfred Ethier (1998), Paul 
Krugman (1991), Philip Levy (1997), Panagariya and Findlay (1998), and Sang-Seung Yi (1996). 
3 Grossman and Helpman (1995) allow for ROOs that prevent transshipment of goods imported by a lower 
tariff member to the higher tariff member.  In contrast, our focus is on ROOs based on input usage. 
 are an integral part of the answer to the first question.  To determine how they impact the 
political viability of FTAs, we must determine how they impact the welfare implications of 
FTAs. 
Our analysis is conducted within a conventional general-equilibrium model that has three 
final goods and an intermediate input used in the production of one of the final goods.  One 
partner is assumed to import the input and export the final good using the input. The other 
partner exports the input and imports the final good, thereby, opening the way for the exchange 
of a tariff preference in the final good for a ROO.  This setting is particularly relevant to the 
recent wave of FTAs between developed and developing countries such as the one between the 
United States and Mexico.
4 In such arrangements, the developing country member typically 
exports final goods that use inputs exported by the developed country member. From the U.S.-
Mexico example we know that ROOs play a crucial role in making FTAs politically feasible. 
A key welfare result we derive is that, in general, the ROOs may lower or raise the joint 
welfare of the union.  On the one hand, a ROO diverts trade in the intermediate input by 
substituting within-union supply for outside-union supply. On the other, it can undo trade 
diversion in the final good using the input.  Thus, the net effect is ambiguous.
5  When the ROO is 
weakly binding, a tightening of it improves joint welfare because the loss from the price 
distortion in the intermediate input market is second-order small. However, as the ROO is 
tightened further, the loss from the input price distortion can more than offset the benefit in the 
                                                 
4 Similar arrangements have been concluded recently by the European Union with countries in North Africa. 
5 This result was anticipated by Panagariya (1999) but not proved formally. Ju and Krishna (1998) also touch 
on it but their focus being on the accessibility of the outside world to the union’s markets in final and 
intermediate goods, they stop short of deriving the welfare result formally. 
  1 final good market.  In the special case when the post FTA price of the final good is at its free 
trade level, the ROO is unambiguously harmful since in this case, there is no trade diversion in 
the final good to be reversed. 
The political-economy analysis of FTAs is developed in three steps. First, using the 
original Grossman-Helpman (1994) model, we determine the structure of tariffs in the initial 
equilibrium.  The key result here is that the tariff on the input is zero in both partners.
6  Second, 
we study the viability of an FTA in the absence of the ROOs.  Third, we ask whether the FTAs 
that are rejected in the second step could become acceptable in the presence of ROOs. 
In our model, the union members are necessarily asymmetric in that one imports the input 
while the other imports the final good using it.  Neutralizing for other sources of asymmetry and 
assuming that neither country’s supply is large enough to displace the rest of the world from the 
market of the other, we show that the country importing the final good that uses the input rejects 
the FTA in the absence of ROOs.  The reason is that while the tariff preference offered in the 
final good by this country causes a loss of tariff revenue, it does not make any corresponding 
tariff-revenue gain in its partner’s market.  The latter result follows from the fact that the 
endogenously determined tariff on the input in the country importing the input is already zero.  
The only situation in which this country can gain and hence accept the FTA is the one in which 
the partner’s supply of the final good is large enough to entirely displace the rest of the world as 
a source of supply.  
                                                 
6 This result is anticipated but not formally derived in Grossman and Helpman (1994) since intermediate 
inputs are absent from their model. 
 
 
  2 The introduction of a binding ROO alters these outcomes. The ROO increases the price 
of the regionally produced intermediate input and hence effectively provides protection to it. The 
FTA that was unattractive to the input exporter in the absence of a ROO can now become 
attractive. Therefore, the ROO can make a previously infeasible FTA feasible. When an FTA 
becomes feasible after the inclusion of the ROO, two interesting possibilities are shown to arise. 
(i) An FTA that lowered the joint welfare of the union and was rejected in the absence of the 
ROO is accepted upon the inclusion of such a rule; and (ii) an FTA that improved joint welfare 
of the union but was nevertheless rejected in the absence of the ROO is accepted, but the 
supporting ROO is so distortionary that the FTA lowers the union’s joint welfare relative to the 
status quo. 
  The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a general equilibrium model of trade is 
developed to analyze the economic and political characteristics of the initial equilibrium, based 
on a nondiscriminatory tariff.  In Section 3, the economic consequences of a FTA and the 
viability of its endorsement are analyzed in the absence of ROOs. A ROO is then introduced and 
the resulting price and welfare outcomes are derived in Section 4.  In Section 5, the viability and 
welfare implications of the FTA are reassessed when the latter encompasses the ROO.  Some 
numerical examples are provided to highlight the key results in this section.  Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
2.  The Model 
Consider a world comprised of three countries, the home country (HC), the foreign 
country (FC) and the Rest Of the World (ROW), producing and trading four goods, 0, 1, 2 and 
m.  Goods 0, 1 and 2 are final, and m a pure intermediate input used in the production of good 1. 
Good 0 is the numeraire, which balances trade for the three countries.  All final goods are 
  3 consumed in all three countries. The potential partners HC and FC are small in relation to the 
ROW.  All markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.  The world price of commodity i, (i 
= 0, 1, 2, m) is denoted Pi
W and is determined in the ROW. Units of goods are chosen such that 
all world prices can be normalized to 1, i.e., Pi
W = 1.
7  Initial tariffs are nondiscriminatory so that 
the domestic price of each good exceeds its world price by per-unit tariff.
8 All tariff revenue is 
redistributed to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion.  
We describe the variables and functions associated with HC in detail; those associated 
with FC are defined similarly and distinguished by an asterisk (*).  Xi and ci  (i = 0, 1, 2, m) 
denote the quantities of good i supplied and demanded, Li (i = 0, 1, 2, m) and  i K  (i = 1, 2, m) the 
quantities of labor and specific factor used in good i, L the total endowment of labor, and Pi (i = 
1, 2, m) the domestic price of non-numeraire good i. 
Consumption: We normalize the number of consumers at unity. As in Grossman and Helpman 
(1994, 1995), assume quasi-linear preferences.  The consumer solves  
(1)    
i
22
ii 0 0 i i c
i=1 i=1
Min Pc +c  subject to U= c + u (c ) , ∑∑   
                                                 
7 The production and demand structure in the ROW turn out to be irrelevant for our analysis and is, 
therefore, not modeled. 
8 We rule out the export and import subsidies by assumption.  Article XVIII of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 
prohibit export subsidies.  Though the GATT does not prohibit import subsides, they are rarely used and, 
therefore, ruled out in our analysis.  
 
 
  4 whereUis an exogenously specified level of utility and the ui(.) are differentiable, increasing and 
strictly concave sub-utility functions for the non-numeraire final goods (ui′ > 0 and ui″ < 0). The 
first order conditions generate the demand functions, ci = di(Pi), where di(.) is the inverse of ui′(.). 
The solution to (1) generates the following expenditure function for the home country:  




E(1,P ,P ;U)  =  U+ e (P) , ∑  
where, -ei(Pi) = is the consumer’s surplus derived from the consumption of  the 
non-numeraire good i.  It is readily verified that c
iii i ii u (d (P))-Pd (P)
i = ei′(Pi). 
Production: The numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale (CRS), using labor 
only. In particular, its production function is written as X0 = L0 with the competitive wage, w, 
getting fixed at 1. The production functions for non-numeraire goods are given by:  
(3)    
m





(i) X = Min {V , } , V =F(L ,K )
a
( i i )  X=  F( L, K) ,
(iii) X = F (L ,K ).
 
The Fi(.), (i = 1, 2, m) are CRS, increasing and concave in their arguments. The production of 
good 1 occurs in two stages. First, a composite factor of production, which we call “value added” 
and denote by V1, is produced and then am units of m are combined with one unit of V1 to 
produce one unit of good 1.
9  Given this production structure, the producer in each sector 
chooses Li to solve the following optimization problem:  
                                                 
9 This production function (also employed by Ramon Lopez and Panagariya (1992) among others) allows for 
substitutability between primary factors but not between the intermediate input and primary factors.  A more 
general specification makes the handling of ROOs cumbersome. However, even if substitutability were 




11 11 1 1 1 1 L
ii ii i i i i L
π (P ;K )=max P F(L ,K ) - L ,
π (P;K )=max PF(L ,K ) - L , i=2, m.
 
The πi(.), denote the rent earned by the specific factor  i K .  For good 1, the net value-added price 
received by producers is P1
v = P1 - amPm where P1 is the final-good price and amPm is per-unit 
cost of the intermediate input. As usual, the πi(.) are increasing and convex in the price, with Xi = 
πi¢(.), where Xi  is the quantity of good i supplied.  
The Pattern of Trade under MFN Tariffs: Under nondiscriminatory tariffs, the differences in 
factor endowments and production technologies across countries are assumed to be such as to 
generate the pattern of trade shown in Figure 1. An FTA between HC and FC may change this 
pattern.  
From Figure 1, HC imports input m from FC and exports (final) good 1 to it. For 
concreteness, the reader may wish to identify HC with Mexico and FC with the United States. 
Each potential union member also imports the good imported from its “potential partner”, from 
ROW. As in Grossman and Helpman (1995), both HC and FC could import other final goods, 
represented by good 2, from ROW (as shown in Figure 1). However, to sharpen the focus on the 
role of input specific ROOs, we drop good 2 from our analysis.
10 Using t, with appropriate sub- 
and super-scripts, to denote per-unit tariff rate, the domestic price of m in HC is 1+tm and that of 
                                                                                                                                                             
allowed, as long as the intermediate and value-added inputs are not perfect substitutes, the general results of 
the analysis will not change.  
 
10 For a detailed analysis of ROOs in FTAs where both partners import good 2 from the ROW see Duttagupta 
(2000). 
  6 good 1in FC is 1+t1
*. With no intervention in exportable goods, the price of good 1 in HC and of 
m in FC is 1. The price of the numeraire good 0 is 1 everywhere as it is free from duties whether 
it is imported or exported. 
We have already determined the demand and output of each non-numeraire good in terms 
of its price.  The output and demand for the numeraire good are determined as residuals. We can 
then determine utility from the income-expenditure equality.  Since income consists of wages, 
profits and tariff revenue, equation (2) yields,  
(5)     U = L+ [π1(1-am(1+tm)) + πm(1+tm) ] + [-e1(1)] + [tm{amπ1′(.) -πm′(.)} ] 
  Note that in this equality, L represents the wage income while the terms in successive 
pairs of square brackets represent profits, consumer’s surplus and tariff revenue.  As expected, 
utility equals income as measured by wages, profits and tariff revenue plus the consumer’s 
surplus. 
Endogenous Tariffs.  Tariff rates can now be endogenized.  We assume that tariff rates are 
chosen (in each country) so as to maximize a weighted sum of welfare as measured by U and 
producers’ profits.  In HC, this objective function is represented by 






=π + ∑ g U
                                                
 
Note that since profits also enter U, they receive a weight of 1+g in G whereas the remaining 
components of U receive a weight of g only.
11 
 
11 Analogously, we have G
∗ for FC. 
 
  7   There are at least two ways to rationalize the choice of tariffs based on the maximization 
of (6). First, the first-order conditions obtained by maximizing (6) with respect to tariff rates are 
the same as those obtained under the Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobbying game between the 
government and the lobbyists, where lobbyists are the owners of sector-specific factors. Second, 
the solution implied by the maximization of (6) is equivalent to that obtained from a Nash 
bargaining game between a welfare maximizing government and the owners of sector-specific 
factors. For the future reference, we note that the acceptance or rejection of an FTA will be based 
on the evaluation of (6), which also coincides with the pressured or coalition-proof FTA 
equilibrium of Grossman and Helpman (1995). Thus, the use of (6) is a short cut to the 
Grossman-Helpman game for the choice of initial tariffs as well as that of FTA.  
Restricting tariff to be nonnegative, maximization of (6) with respect to the tariff rates 
yields, 
(7)         1m t = 0, t = 0.
Given HC exports good 1, the lobby for it would like exports to be subsidized.  But since we rule 
out export subsidies by appeal to Article XVIII of GATT, we obtain t1 = 0.  In the case of the 
imported intermediate input, the story is slightly more involved.  The lobby for  m Kw a n t s  a  
positive tariff but that for  1 K  wants the opposite.  The lobby for  1 K , thus, actively contests the 
lobby for  m K . The lobbying strength over the intermediate input price is then determined from 
the relative buying or selling power in the intermediate input market. As HC is a net importer of 
m, the lobbying strength of the owners of  1 K  (proportional to total demand for m) exceeds that 
  8 of  m K (proportional to domestic supply of m). Thus, the interior solution turns out to be an 
import subsidy, which we rule out by assumption.
 12 
Tariff rates in FC are given by, 













1 is the ratio of domestic output of good 1 to its imports and η
*
1 the absolute value of the 
price elasticity of import demand for good 1 in FC. For the imported final good (in FC), the 
standard Grossman and Helpman (1994) result is obtained: the MFN tariff is inversely 
proportional to the elasticity of import demand and the government’s weight on social welfare, 
and directly proportional to the ratio of domestic production to the imports of that good.  
This structure of initial tariffs has an important bearing on the decision to form an FTA in 
later sections. It establishes the presumption that a country that primarily exports final goods and 
imports intermediate goods stands to benefit from the FTA since it gains access to the protected 
markets of its partners whereas its own input market is already free of tariffs.  Conversely, a 
country that primarily exports intermediate inputs does not have an incentive to endorse the FTA 
in the absence of other sources of gains from the latter.  In Section 5, we will bring ROOs as this 
alternative source. Presently, we consider the politics of FTA in the presence of intermediate 
inputs without ROOs. 
                                                 
12 To avoid any misunderstanding that HC is already a free-trading country, making FTA a fruitless exercise 
for it, we remind that this is merely because we are not considering good 2.  Initial protection in HC can 
readily be brought to bear on the analysis by making the existence of good 2 explicit.  But that will distract 
from out central focus without additional enlightenment. 
  9 3.  The Economics and Politics of FTAs in the Absence of ROOs 
We will assume throughout that when the FTA is formed, the countries freeze their 
external tariffs at their initial, MFN level.  While trade in goods produced within the union is 
freed up entirely, no trade deflection is permitted. To determine whether such an FTA is 
accepted or rejected we evaluate its impacts on welfare and total profits and, hence, on G in (6). 
Under an FTA, each member country removes the import duty on its partner but retains it 
on the rest of the world. Depending on the configurations of demand and supply curves in the 
two member countries, we need to distinguish three analytically distinct possibilities for each 
good.  To see how these three cases play out in our model, consider final good 1, which is 
imported by FC and exported by HC. For the time being we ignore the analytical solutions of the 
tariffs derived on this good in the previous section and denote t1 and t1
* to be per-unit MFN 
tariffs on this good in HC and FC, respectively, and assume  .  0 t t 1
*
1 > ≥
In Figure 2, let I*I* represent the import demand for the good in the country with the 
higher tariff rate, FC.  When the FTA is formed, the tariffs apply to imports from outside only so 
that HC has the incentive to sell all its supply in FC unless doing so lowers the price there below 
it own domestic price, 1 . Based on where the prices in the two countries settle in the new 
equilibrium, we have three cases. 
1 t +
Case 1: Purely Trade Diverting FTA: As long as HC’s total supply curve crosses I*I* at point Y 
or above, as shown by S
1S
1, the price in FC remains 1 .  HC then sells all its production in the 
market of FC, satisfying its domestic demand by imports from ROW.  To the extent that the 
quantity supplied by HC increases, the union’s total imports from outside decline.  This is 
enhanced protection in the Grossman-Helpman terminology or pure trade diversion in the 
Vinerian terminology. FC loses tariff revenue in the amount MHRQ with consumers’ and 
*
1 t +
  10 producers’ surpluses remaining unchanged. Of this loss, area MHJL is net increase in the 
producers’ surplus accruing to HC, and area LJNQ is the additional tariff revenue raised by HC 
(since it now imports quantity LJ instead of buying the latter from its own suppliers). Thus, 
trapezium JHRN is a deadweight loss due to trade diversion.  
Case 2: Purely Trade Creating FTA: At the other extreme, suppose HC’s supply curve intersects 
I
*I
* at point T (whose height is1 ) or below as shown by S 1 t +
2S
2.  In this case, the union-wide 












* below T, HC’s suppliers sell a part of their output in their home market.  The price in FC 
declines to 1  as a result of which there is consumers’ surplus gain, producers’ surplus loss 
and tariff revenue loss. The lost tariff revenue (equal to area MYSQ) goes partially to boost tariff 
revenue gain in HC (equal to the area LTZQ) since the latter now buys a quantity equal to LT 
from outside rather than its own firms, and partially to increase the consumer’s plus producers’ 
surplus in FC (equal to area MYTL). The overall effect on the union is a welfare gain equal to 
area YTZS. This situation is trade creating, and results in “reduced protection” for the unions’ 
producers for that good.  
+
Case 3: Mixed Case: If the supply curve of HC crosses I
*I
* between points Y and T, the price in 
FC is endogenous with producers from HC selling their entire quantity in FC and consumers in 
FC buying their entire quantity from them.  Since we will focus exclusively on cases 1 and 2 in 
our analysis below, we leave this case for the reader to work out. 
  Let us now relate this analysis to the effect of the FTA on the actual prices of the 
particular goods within our specific model.  Recall that in the initial, MFN equilibrium, we have 
t1 = 0.  Therefore, for this good, horizontal lines beginning at 1+t1 and 1 coincide with each 
  11 other.  Thus, HC does not collect any tariff revenue on this good either before or after the 
formation of the FTA.  In the purely trade diverting case, case 1, all of the lost revenue in FC 
becomes the extra producers’ surplus for HC. In the purely trade creating case, case 2, the FTA 
establishes free trade in good 1 in FC, with all of the lost tariff revenue becoming a part of the 
increased net consumers’ surplus in FC. 
In general, the three cases we discussed would also obtain for m.  However, since there is 
no tariff on this good in the MFN equilibrium in either HC or FC, within our model, there is no 
scope for either trade creation or trade diversion. Thus, until a rule of origin is introduced, the 
welfare calculations will not be affected by the changes in this sector.  Indeed, given the strong 
separability across goods in both demand and supply and the fixity of the input price, profits in 
this sector are also unchanged.  Thus, the changes in m make no contribution to the changes in 
G.  This will, of course, change when a ROO is introduced. 
The stage for assessing the feasibility of the FTA is now set. To economize on space, we 
restrict ourselves to cases 1 and 2 for good 1.  
Case 1: FTA is Purely Trade Diverting in Good 1: In good 1, HC benefits and FC is hurt in terms 
of welfare.  Moreover, profits in good 1 rise in HC and are unchanged in FC.  Hence, HC accepts 
the welfare reducing FTA and FC rejects it. This can be easily verified from a rise in the value of 
G in (6) and a fall in the corresponding value of G
* under FTA relative to that under MFN.    
Case 2: FTA is Purely Trade Creating in Good 1: In this case, the price of good 1 drops to the 
world price in the FC.  This leads to a net gain in welfare but decline in profits in sector 1 in FC.  
The price of good 1 faced by producers and consumers in HC remain unchanged at the world 
price of 1. Based purely on the changes in sector 1, HC will weakly endorse the welfare 
  12 increasing FTA but FC’s decision depends on the value of g
*.  These results are summarized in 
Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: (a) An FTA in the absence of a ROO that is purely trade diverting in good 
1 (case 1) is necessarily rejected by FC. (b) If the FTA is purely trade creating in good 1 
(case 2) HC accepts it but FC may accept or reject it.
13 
4.  The Economic Effects of the Rules of Origin 
Let us now assume that under the FTA the duty free status to the exports of good 1 from 
HC to FC is conferred only if they have some minimum content of the intermediate input 
produced within the union.  In practice, there are three main forms that a ROO may take.
14  
(i)  Substantial Transformation: The input imported by a member from outside must 
undergo substantial change in terms of name, character or use to qualify for duty-
free access into another member’s market. 
(ii)  Change in the Tariff Heading: The commodity, assembled from parts originating 
outside the union, must undergo a classification change in the tariff line. 
(iii)  Value-added Test: A minimum percentage of value added must have within-union 
origin. 
                                                 
13 These results would be modified slightly in the presence of good 2. For instance Proposition 1(a) holds if t2 
 t2
* and so on.  See Duttagupta (2000) for details.  ≤




  13 The ROOs based on transformation or tariff classification requirements involve discrete 
changes that are not readily handled by differential calculus unless one works with a model with 
a continuum of production stages.  For this reason, we will work with a ROO that is based on a 
value-added test.  The specific form in which we define the ROO is as follows. Denote by θ  the 
ratio of the intermediate input purchased from within the union to the total quantity of input used 
by the producers of good 1 in HC.  That is to say, 










W is the quantity of the input obtained from the ROW and cm + cm
*+cm
W = amX1.  The 
ROO imposes a lower bound, denoted θR, on the choice of θ.  Producers of good 1 from HC 
receive the tariff-inclusive price in FC only if they use fraction θR of the input from regional 
sources.
15  Formally, the price they receive in FC is given by, 






 = (1+t ) if θθ
      =1 if θ < θ .
≥ R
                                                
If the ROO (i.e., θR) is set at a sufficiently high level, it creates a premium on the within-
union supply of m thereby raising its price above unity.  The precise price is then determined 
 
15 Alternatively, the ROO can be defined in terms of the final good price or unit cost.  The former would 
place a floor on the within-union value added as a proportion of the price in the importing country, i.e., on 
[P1
* - am(1-θ)]/ P1
*.  The latter would apply a floor to within-union cost as a fraction of total cost, i.e., on  
[P1
v + θ amPm]/[ P1
v+ θ amPm + am(1-θ)].   As shown in Duttagupta (2000), these criteria are equivalent to each 
other and to that defined in (9) and (10). 
 
  14 endogenously by the regional demand for and supply of m.  An understanding of how this price 
is determined is important for our subsequent analysis and requires a careful consideration. 
4.1 Effects of the ROO: Positive Analysis 
The price effects of the ROO depend on whether the initial FTA is trade diverting or 
trade creating in good 1. Hence, we consider both these cases individually. 
Case1: Purely Trade Diverting FTA in Good 1: Consider the post-FTA supply of the value-added 
input, V1, in HC and relate it to the regional market for m. These are depicted in Figures 3(a) and 
3(b) respectively.  In Figure 3(a), S
vS
v denotes the supply curve of V1, the value-added input. 
Under the FTA with no ROO, the price received for V1 is 1+t1
*-am.  The quantity of V1 supplied 
at this price equals OXF, which is also the quantity of good 1 exported by HC at price P1
* = 1+t1
*. 
Figure 3(b) shows the corresponding market for the intermediate input.  Sm+m*Sm+m* is the 




m and the supply of V1 in Figure 3(a), we can compute the total demand for the input by HC.  
Let this demand be represented by OMT. Let quantity OMF equal the supply of m in HC plus the 
export supply of FC.  The remaining demand for m in HC, MFMT, is satisfied by imports from 
outside the union.  The value of θ in this situation is given by the ratio of OMF to OMT.  
Now suppose that a ROO is introduced.  Define   so that θ
1
1F θ  OM /OM ≡
1 θ
T 1 is the ratio of 
the total within-union supply of the input to its usage by the producers of good 1 in HC in the 
absence of a ROO.  As long as the ROO is set at θ , exporters of good 1 do not feel the bite 
of the ROO. They satisfy the ROO by drawing extra units of m from input producers in FC and 
buying less from outside. Correspondingly, FC’s producers of good 1 buy less of the input from 
their own input producers and more from outside.  We have, 
R ≤
  15 (11)     P=    mR 1  f o r  θθ ≤ 1
m
If the ROO is increased beyond  , however, the supply of regional m must rise.  This, in 
turn, requires an increase in the price of m.  Since the regionally supplied m now carries a 
premium, P
1 θ
m is no longer tied to the world price.  Effectively, the regionally supplied m is a 
different input than that imported from outside the union. 
Formally, the price of the regionally supplied input is now determined by the interaction 
of HC’s demand for it and the total quantity supplied by the two countries together.  That is to 
say, Pm is obtained by solving the following equation: 
(12)    
v*
R m 1 1 mm mm R 1 R 2 θ a π (P ) = π (P ) π (P );   θ  such that  θ  θ    θ . ′ ′′ +∀ ≤ ≤
The left-hand side of (12) represents the demand for the input by the exporters of good 1 
in HC and the right-hand side its total within-union supply.  The value-added price received for 
each unit of good 1 sold by the firms in HC to buyers in FC is P= . For 
each unit of the input used by the producers of good 1 in HC, θ
v*
11 m R m R 1 + t- a{ θ P+ ( 1 - θ )}
R is purchased regionally at Pm 
and 1-θR from outside the union at a price of 1.  Thus, the effective price for each unit of m is 
.  Rm R θ P+ ( 1 - θ )
The upper limit on θR, denoted θ2 in equation (12), is chosen so as to ensure that the ROO 
does not become so restrictive as to lower P1
v below 1- am.  That is to say, θ2 is obtained by 
solving, 
(13)    
v*








θ  =     θ  
a( P- 1 )
≡ . 
  16 Here Pm is obtained from equation (12). When θR exceeds θ2, producers of good 1 in HC 
would rather import the input from the world market at the price of 1 and sell their output at 
home and thus earn P1
v = 1- am, unless the increase in the ROO is met by a corresponding fall in 
Pm to satisfy equation (14).
 16  
Although Pm rises locally as we raise θR at θR = θ1, this is not necessarily so at 
intermediate values.  An examination of the effect of a change in θR on Pm using (12) and the 
first equality in (13) readily demonstrates this fact.  Straightforward manipulations yield 












where ε1 is the elasticity of supply of good 1 in HC, εm
D the absolute value of the elasticity of 
demand for within-union m and εm
S the elasticity of total supply of m within the union.  The first 
elasticity is defined with respect to  and the last two with respect to P
v
1 P m. The denominator of 
(15) is positive.  Therefore, since Pm = 1 at θR = θ1, the right-hand side is unambiguously positive 
when the ROO is just binding.  But once Pm has risen above 1, the numerator of (15) can turn 
negative.  Note that even at the upper extreme value of θR, i.e., θR = θ2, the right-hand side of 
(15) can be positive.  
Intuitively, an increase in θR has two effects on the demand for m. At a constant output of 
good 1, the change increases the demand for m, which is a scale effect. But by reducing P (see 
v
1
                                                 
16 It is possible that θR reaches the value of 1 before P1
v reaches 1-am, i.e., θ2 solved in (14) is larger than 
unity. In this case, the upper limit on θR is 1 and the producers of good 1 in HC always find it more profitable 
to export to FC. 
  17 the definition of   above), it also reduces the output of good 1 and, hence, the demand for m, 
which is a substitution effect. At P
v
1 P
m = 1, the latter effect is absent so that the demand for m and 
hence Pm necessarily rises. At Pm > 1, both effects are present. The outcome now depends on the 
relative strength of the second effect.  The larger is ε1, i.e., the more elastic the export supply 
curve for good 1, the larger the output response of good 1 to the change in P1
v and the larger the 
second effect.
17 Hence, Pm could monotonically increase with the ROO, if the first effect always 
dominates over the second. Again, Pm could first rise, then reach a maximum and then decline. 
We summarize these results in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: Assuming the union is purely trade diverting in the final good, Pm may rise 
monotonically, have an inverted-U shape, or exhibit multiple peaks as a function of the 
ROO.  
We now turn to the purely trade creating case. 
Case 2: Purely Trade Creating Union in Good 1: Recall that in this case, in the absence of a 
ROO, producers of good 1 in HC sell in their home market as well as in FC with the FTA price 
of the good dropping to the world price of 1.  In this case, once the ROO becomes binding, an 
increase in it, which increases the cost of exports through an increase in Pm, can be sustained 
only by an increase in the consumer price of good 1 in FC.  Given the fixed tariff on the imports 
from outside, such an increase is, indeed, feasible.  Producers in HC simply divert their sales 
from FC towards the home market, which raises the price in the former market.  
At a binding ROO, the consumer price of good 1 in FC, P1
*, exceeds 1 by just enough to 
yield the exporters in HC the price they receive for value added in their own market, i.e.,  
                                                 
17 In the special case when ε1 = 0, the second effect is absent such that Pm  reaches a maximum when θR= θ2. 
  18 P1
v = 1 – am. Thus, P1
* is endogenously determined by the size of the ROO.  An increase in θR 
and hence Pm correspondingly results in a fall in the proportion of good 1 exported, which is 
denoted by  . The fall in  , in turn, leads to an increase in P
e γ
e γ 1
*. Now at a binding ROO, Pm, 
P1
*and   are endogenously determined by the following three equations: 
e γ
(15)   γ
eθRamπ1′(1-am) = πm′(Pm) + π
*
m′(Pm) ; for θR ≥ θ1 
(16)    
*
1m R m P =1+a θ (P -1).
(17)    
*' * *' * e '
11 11 m 1 m e( P) - π (P - a )=γπ(1- a )
The left hand side of (15) is the demand for the regional intermediate input based on the 
proportion of total production used for exports, where as the right hand side is the overall 
regional supply. The left hand side of (17) is the total import demand for good 1 in FC and right 
hand side is the total exports of good 1 by HC. Differentiating these equations, the following 
proposition on the effect of a small tightening of the ROO at θR = θ1 can be obtained. 
Proposition 3: In the purely trade creating case, starting at θR = θ1, if we increase θR, γ
e 
decreases and Pm and P1
* increase such that the value-added price received on exports, 
, remains constant at 1- .  
v
1 P m a
At an initially strictly binding ROO, further increases in θR may be accompanied by a 
decrease in Pm as in the purely trade diverting case, due to a decline in demand for the 
intermediate input. 
4.2  Effects of the ROO: Welfare 
The ROO affects the joint welfare of the union in two ways. Its direct effect is to divert 
the demand for the intermediate input towards the inefficient regional source by distorting its 
price. Its indirect effect depends on the post FTA market for the final good that uses this input. In 
  19 case 1, the increase in the cost of exports caused by the ROO reduces the export supply of good 1 
and reverses the initial trade diversion in this market. However, in case 2, there is no trade 
diversion in this market to be reversed, and the ROO causes a distortion in the consumer price of 
the good in FC.  
Proposition 4: (a) When the initial FTA is trade diverting in good 1 (case 1), and the 
ROO is increased at the weakly binding level, joint welfare of the partners improves, but 
as we continue to tighten the ROO, joint welfare can eventually fall. (b) When the initial 
FTA is trade creating in good 1(case 2), a tightening of a binding ROO weakly worsens 
the joint welfare of the union. 
We can verify these conclusions by evaluating the welfare levels of HC and FC under the 
ROO and then differentiating the expression for joint welfare with respect to θR under the 
alternative cases.
18 The intuition behind Proposition 4 (a) can be best understood by referring to 
Figures 3(a) and 3(b).  In Figure 3(a) the increase in ROO lowers the level of export production 
of good 1 from OXF to OXR. Thus, the increase in production efficiency in that market is given 
by area abcd. This area is FC’s (and the unions’) overall gain from substituting production from 
the less efficient HC to that from the ROW and is proportional to t1
*, the external tariff on good 
1.  Figure 3(b) shows the cost of introducing a distortion in the regional market for m.  This 
distortion is proportional to (Pm-1) and the associated cost is equal to area efg. The efficiency 
costs of distortion fall on HC and the union as a whole. When Pm is close to 1, the distortion is 
negligible and net joint welfare gains are positive. But as the ROO pushes P1
v sufficiently close 
to 1 – am and the input price sufficiently far from 1, the extra gains from further tightening of the 
                                                 
18 See Duttagupta (2000) for the detailed algebraic analysis. 
 
  20 ROO in the final-good market in Figure 3(a) can be smaller than the extra losses from the 
misallocation of resources in the input market in Figure 3(b).  Thus, the tightening of the ROO 
would first raise welfare and then lower it. 
Proposition 4(b) follows from the fact that, in the absence of the ROO, the FTA leads to 
the free-trade outcome. Therefore, at θR = θ1, the effect of the introduction of a just binding ROO 
on joint welfare is second-order small and welfare neither rises nor falls.  But as we tighten the 
ROO, welfare declines due to increased distortion in both the final-good and input markets.  
Note that the cost of the ROO on the exports of good 1 from HC is partially transmitted to the 
consumers of good 1 in FC through an increase in the price paid by them.  This leads to a net loss 
in consumers’ plus producers’ surplus in good l, which is proportional to the distortion in the 
regional price of good m.
19  
5.  Political Viability of FTA with ROO 
We first consider the impact of ROOs on the viability of FTAs, outlining the analytic 
argument for how a ROO could make a previously infeasible FTA become feasible and alter the 
welfare implications of such changes.  We then switch to the linear case to provide explicit 
examples that prove our main results. 
                                                 
19 The result in Proposition 4(b) can also be generated from Grossman and Helpman (1995). In their model, if 
transshipment of goods were allowed, then the FTA would effectively lead to free trade. To the extent ROO 
disallows transshipment, it also allows for some trade diverting FTAs. This result is close in spirit to 
Proposition 4(b). However, what does not follow from the Grossman-Helpman model is the possibility that 
ROOs can be welfare improving, which becomes clear when we consider the linkages between intermediate 
and final goods as we do here. 
  21 5.1  ROOs, FTA Viability and Welfare 
The introduction of a binding ROO increases the regional price of m, and hence the 
returns to the owners of 
*
m  and Km K .  It is this key effect of the ROO that can make previously 
infeasible FTAs become feasible. In terms of the objective function being maximized, recall 
from Section 3 (Proposition 1) that in the absence of a ROO, the FTA leads to a reduction in G
* 
relative to its level under the MFN tariff. The increase in the returns to 
*
m K , induced by the 
ROO, may reverse this reduction.  In terms of the Grossman-Helpman set-up, the ROO enhances 
the potential lobbying strengths of input producers.  These lobbyists may therefore help switch 
the government’s decision in favor of the FTA in the country that rejected it in the absence of the 
ROO.  More precisely, the outcome in the presence of a ROO can be summarized in the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 5: (a) An initially infeasible FTA that reduces joint welfare of the union (case 
1) can become feasible after the inclusion of a ROO. (b) An initially infeasible FTA that 
improves the joint welfare of the union (case 2) can become feasible at the inclusion of 
the ROO, although the ROO supporting it can be so distortionary that joint welfare of the 
union actually falls with the FTA.  
We first offer the intuitive argument underlying Proposition 4. The definite proof will be 
shown by recourse to numerical examples below.  First consider Proposition 5 (a). Recall from 
Proposition 1 that the FTA is unambiguously endorsed by HC in the absence of the ROO. When 
the FTA includes the ROO, the return to  1 K  remains at least as high as that under the MFN 
tariff.  In addition, when the ROO binds, the owners of  m K  benefit more in the presence of the 
ROO than in its absence.  This implies that the FTA with ROO remains acceptable to HC. 
  22 Thus, the fate of the FTA is determined by FC.  Recall that in the absence of ROO, FC 
votes against the FTA due to the tariff revenue loss in the final good market but no compensating 
gain in the input market.   In the presence of the ROO, the tariff revenue loss in sector 1 is less 
and profits in sector m are strictly higher than under the MFN tariffs. Moreover, the increase in 
the profits gets a larger weight in G
* than the loss in tariff revenue. These factors help raise G
* 
and may make it larger than under MFN tariffs. 
Now consider the welfare implications of this FTA. From Proposition 4 (a) we know that 
the initiation of a strictly binding ROO improves joint welfare of the union relative to the 
situation where there were no ROOs. However, joint welfare of the union under the FTA could 
still be less compared to that under the initial MFN equilibrium. 
Next, consider Proposition 5 (b). Because the owners of  1 K  receive as much as under 
MFN while the owners of  m K  benefit with a strictly binding ROO, HC votes in favor of the 
FTA. Again, the outcome of the FTA depends on the FC. FC’s vote may be positive or negative 
in the absence of the ROO.  When it is negative, it may once again switch due to the fact that the 
ROO increases the price of good 1 as well as m.  This redistributes income in favor of producers 
and, for sufficiently high values of g
*, may turn a previously negative vote into a positive one.
20 
Now consider the welfare outcome of this FTA. From Proposition 4 (b) we know that the 
initiation of the binding ROO worsens joint welfare of the union. Hence, at a stringent ROO 
                                                 
20 We note that there are also cases when the ROO can make previously feasible FTAs infeasible.  From a 
practical standpoint, we regard these cases as less interesting and do not explore in detail here.  Some further 
details can be found, however, in Duttagupta (2000). 
 
 
  23 while the FTA might become politically feasible, it might be harmful for the union in term of 
welfare. 
We now consider specific numerical examples to substantiate our argument in 
Proposition 5. 
5.2   ROO, FTA Viability and Welfare: Numerical Examples 
Denote the demand function for final good 1 in HC by   and the supply 
functions for goods 1 and m by   and  respectively where c > 0 and   
for k = 1, m.  Assume also that both governments assign identical weights to social welfare, g. 
Then, at the MFN equilibrium, the tariffs for good 1 in FC and input m in HC (following the 
derivations in Section 2) are given by: 
1 D  = D - cP 1
1
v
11 X =  α P mm M = α P   k α  > 0










*  tm = 0. 
Consider first the welfare implications of the FTA in the absence of the ROO. 
Case 1: Purely Trade Diverting Case: This purely trade diverting case requires that the total, 
within union supply in the FTA equilibrium without ROO be smaller than the total demand of 
the FC.  This condition implies:  
(19)        . 
** **
11 1 1 D - (1+t )c > (α +α ) (1+t -a ) m
From Proposition 1(a), FC rejects this FTA in the absence of the ROO.  We also know that being 
purely trade diverting, the proposed FTA lowers the joint welfare of the union.   
To investigate the fate of the FTA under the ROO, note that the endogenous price of the regional 
intermediate input in the present case is given by, 
(20)      
22 *
mR 1 m m R
m 22
mm R











β  .  
  24 For the above price of regional m, the difference between the value of G
* under the FTA with 
ROO and MFN tariffs can be shown to be equal to 
(21)    
*
** * * 2 m
ROO MFN 1 1 1 m m R m m
Tariff revenue loss from good 1
Increase in rents of m
α
G- G= -  g { t α (1 + t -a - a θ (P - 1))  +  (1+g) {(P ) - 1}.
2 14444 4 244444 3 14 424 4 3
 
The price in (21) and, hence, the right-hand side expression in (22) are non-linear in θR. 
To obtain numerical solutions, we simulate Pm for a range of strictly binding values of θR. The 
parameters satisfy the conditions required to maintain the initial MFN pattern of trade and to 
maintain equation (19) required to validate case 1. The slope parameter α  is varied to obtain a 




* ranging from 20% to 40%. The simulation results are given 
in Figure 4(a) for two particular values of t1
* (t1
*= 0.24 and 0.32) and g = 1. The upper left Panel 








m achieves a maximum at a ROO between 0.90 and 0.95. Meanwhile the lower left panel 
indicates that the value-added export price P1
v falls monotonically with increases in the ROO. On 




MFN increases with increase in ROO. The FTA is weakly 




MFN is zero. This happens at θ 0.92 when  0.24 and at 
0.96 when  0.32.  However, at these ROOs, the change in the union’s joint welfare, 
shown in the upper right panel, is negative; the FTA continues to be welfare reducing after the 





Case 2: Purely Trade Creating Case: This purely trade creating case requires that the total, within 
union supply in the FTA equilibrium without ROO be equal to the total demand of the FC.  For 
the assumed demand and supply curves, this condition implies:  
(22)     ,  
** e
1m 1m D-  c  =  α (1- a ) + γα(1- a )
  25 where γ
e is as defined in Section 4. This FTA is welfare improving for FC and has no effect on 
the welfare of HC.  Being purely trade creating in the absence of a ROO, the FTA necessarily 
improves joint welfare. 
In HC, the FTA leaves the value of G unchanged so that it weakly accepts the FTA.  
However, in FC, the reduction in the price of good 1 can lower the value of G
* by lowering the 
return on 
*
1 K .  In terms of the Grossman-Helpman set-up, counter lobbies from 
*
1 K  can force the 
equilibrium outcome to be a pressured MFN stance.  
Consider now the FTA in the presence of a ROO.  Initially, a binding ROO increases the 
input price, which in turn, raises the price of good 1 faced by consumers in FC. We maintain all 
parameter values at the same values as under case 1 except α , which is assigned a higher value 
to ensure higher export capacity of good 1 in conformity with equation (24).  It is verified that 
for the assumed values of the parameters, the value of G
1
* under the FTA without ROO is less 
than that under MFN tariffs. 
The three equations determining   are given by: 
*
m1 P , P  and γ
e





P =   θγa( 1 -  a)
α +α
m , 
(24)       , and 
*
1m R m P  = 1 + a θ (P - 1)
(25)      
*** *
e 11 1 m
1m
(D - cP ) - α (P - a )
γ  = 
α (1- a )
. 




MFN is strictly positive 
for all ROOs, implying that the FTA is unambiguously endorsed by FC.  Also notice, that the 
price of good 1 in FC, P1
*, increases monotonically with the increase in the stringency of the 
ROO. If the ROO is such that θ  0.35, then joint welfare improves with the FTA. However,  R ≤
  26 for θ , the ROO is so distortionary that joint welfare of the union actually falls with the 
FTA.
R 0.35 >
21 These simulations validate proposition 5 (b) for the trade creating FTA.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper offers an analysis of the relationship among traded intermediate inputs, rules 
of origin, welfare and political feasibility of FTAs.  Our main results may be summarized as 
follows.  First, contrary to the general impression in the policy literature, a ROO may improve or 
worsen the joint welfare of the union. 
Second, the price distortion created by the ROO has a direct bearing on the political 
economy of the FTA endorsement.  By increasing rents for the interest group that owns the 
intermediate input, the ROO strengthens their potential influence on the government. Therefore 
there are situations when a member who unambiguously votes against the FTA in the absence of 
ROO would switch its vote in its presence. 
Finally and most importantly, the paper addresses the social desirability of an FTA that 
becomes feasible after the inclusion of a ROO.  We offer two results that have potentially 
important policy implications.  One, an initially infeasible but welfare-reducing FTA becomes 
feasible after the inclusion of the ROO.  And two, an infeasible but joint welfare improving FTA 
becomes feasible upon ROO inclusion. However, the ROO can be so distortionary that after 
including its inclusion, the FTA becomes joint welfare diminishing. 
                                                 
21 This is an important caveat to bear in mind for FTAs like the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) where the value-added ROOs in most sectors are typically between 0.50 and 0.625. 
 
  27 Our paper provides insight into the politics behind the widespread use of product specific 
ROOs in the FTAs. For instance, the successful lobbying for strict ROO by the auto parts 
manufacturers in the United States under NAFTA did increase the trade in auto parts between 
Mexico and the United States. Similarly, the yarn forward rule directing trade in textiles in the 
NAFTA (which virtually amounts to a 100% value-added ROO) has played a crucial role in the 
phenomenal expansion of the U.S-Mexican trade in textiles.
22 As this analysis has shown, ROOs 
that protect domestic import competing industries as well as intermediate exporting industries 
improve the chances of FTA endorsement for the country exporting inputs and importing final 
goods.  However, the FTA that is supported by stringent ROOs may not be desirable as Anne 
Krueger has often argued. 
In conclusion, we note that we have treated the size of the ROO as exogenous.  This can 
itself be subject to industry specific lobbying as evident from the experiences of the automotive 
parts, electronics, and textiles sectors under NAFTA.  This feature can be incorporated into the 
analysis of the paper along the lines of the exclusion of sensitive sectors in Grossman and 
Helpman (1995).  In view of the space constraints, we leave this extension to a future paper.  
                                                 
 
22 See Joseph A. LaNasa (1993) for an analysis of the restrictive nature of ROOs under the NAFTA. 
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Figure 2: Post FTA market of an import good in FC 
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Figure 3b: The Regional Market for m
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